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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no other exercise of the prerogatives of national sovereignty during the past two decades has proven so divisive to the
community of nations or created quite as much uncertainty in international commerce as the taking of an alien investor's property
by host States. Certainly these takings have contributed mightily
to the intensity of the confrontation between the Third World
and the developed nations. As a result of these confrontations the
line has been clearly drawn between the industrialized nations
and those developing countries of the Third World that subscribe
to the precepts of the New International Economic Order, an
emotional appeal for redistribution of the World's wealth.1 Both
* A.B., Fordham; M.A., U.C.L.A.; J.D., U. of San Francisco; LL.M. (Int'l Legal Studies), N.Y.U. Mr. Neville practices law in New York City.
1. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G. A. Res. 3201, 21 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 7), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201
(S-VI) (1974). Paragraph 4 of this Resolution declaims that
[t]he new international economic order should be founded on full respect
for the following principles:
(e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural re-
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groups of nations advance well-defined and contrasting arguments in support of their positions on taking of property, the law
governing such takings, and the terms and conditions of compensation. This article will discuss the current status under international law of these conflicting views.

II.

THE NATURE OF THE TAKING

The Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens "Draft Convention" in Art.
10(3) recognizes that a foreign government's imposition of exorbitant taxes or confiscatory licensing fees should be deemed a "taking" just as the taking of title to property. 2 The explanatory note
to the Harvard Draft Convention states that a State may employ
an infinite variety of indirect takings, for example: blocking a factory entrance under guise of maintaining order; setting prohibi-

sources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them
and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political
or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of
this inalienable right.
Moreover, the Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order declares that all efforts should be made to take measures for
the recovery, exploitation, development, marketing, and distribution of natural
resources, particularly of developing countries. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 6) 3,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3202 (S-VI) (1974). For the United States reaction to the Declaration, see the excerpted statement of then-Ambassador Scali, reprinted in
1974 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. at 490. See also Haight, The New International
Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9
INT'L LAW. 591 (1975).
2. Article 10(3) provides: (a) A "taking of property" includes not only an
outright taking of property but also any such unreasonable interference
with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as to justify an inference
that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the
property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such
interference.
(b) A "taking of the use of property" includes not only an outright taking
of use but also any unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of
property for a limited period of time.
Draft Convention, reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 553
(1961)[hereinafter Sohn and Baxter].
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tive wage levels; denying entry visas for essential personnel; or
restrictive customs, foreign exchange or export regulations. 3
It has long been recognized in academic quarters that developing countries risk alienating direct foreign investment necessary
to develop their natural resources by resorting to "constructive
takings."' 4 In a recent arbitration proceeding 5 involving the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), the United
States Government rejected the argument that imposition of a
levy upon a mining concessionaire in violation of an investment
agreement was a taking of property. This dispute arose between
the investor, Revere Copper and Brass, and its host State, the
Republic of Jamaica; it discloses OPIC's current attitudes toward
creeping expropriation. It is also useful as a case study of the modus operandi of developing country intent on increasing its share
of gain from an extant concession.
III.

THE LAW GOVERNING DIspuTEs ARISING FROM A "TAKING"

One of the most perplexing questions posed by expropriation
cases is the threshold inquiry: which law governs the propriety of
taking and determines the measure of compensation to be paid.
The two possible sources of legal standards, municipal law or international law, often dictate widely differing results. An early decision supporting the position that a State's municipal law was to
be applied to disputes arising from contracts between foreign investors and their host States was rendered by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Serbian Loans Case. The
Court held that: "Any contract which is not a contract between
States in their capacity as subjects of international law, is based

3. Sohn & Baxter, supra note 2 at 559.
4. Gardner, International Measures for the Promotion and Protection of
Foreign Investment, 1959 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 255, 262. See also Weston,
"Constructive Takings" under International Law: A Modest Foray into the
Problem of "Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975); Christie,
What Constitutes A Taking of Property Under InternationalLaw?, 38 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1962).
5. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. O.P.I.C., 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1321 (1978)
(Haight & Wetzel, Arbs.).
6. OPIC is the semi-autonomous U.S. Government agency which provides investment insurance to United States corporations against the risk of inconvertibility of profits or expropriation. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1976). See Meron,
OPIC Investment Insurance Is Alive and Well, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1979);
MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

111-18 (1976).
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on the municipal law of some country."'7 Despite the general applicability of a municipal body of law implied by this language, an
exception has been created for long-term economic development
agreement which allows private concessionaires to contract for
the right to develop or extract a State's natural resources without
subjecting the agreement to the dangers of subsequent reinterpretation under municipal law. The limits of this exception were explored in the Revere Copper arbitration. Developing countries
generally take the position that the municipal law of the taking

state must govern any controversies that arise. They rely on Article 2(c) of the United Nations' "Charter of Economic Rights and

Duties of States," which states:
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually
agreed by all states concerned that other peaceful means be sought
on the basis of the sovereign equality of states and in accordance
with the principle of free choice of means.8

7. Payment of Certain Serbian Loans Issued in France, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser.
A., No. 20.
8. G.A. Res. 3281, Article 2(c), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, 52 U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974).
The U.N. Economic and Social Council's Commission on Transnational Corporations expressed this view earlier in its Report on the Second Session, 61
U.N. ECOSOC Supp. (No. 5), U.N. Doc. E/5782 (E/C.10/16) (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ECOSOC Report]. Annex IV to the ECOSOC Report contains a paper
submitted by Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico,
Peru, Trinidad, Tobago, and Venezuela. The first point made in the ECOSOC
Report is that "[tihe transnationalcorporations shall be subject to the laws
and regulations of the host country and, in the case of litigation, they should
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the country in which
they operate." ECOSOC Report, Annex IV at 9 (emphasis in original). Moreover, these countries would deny any effect to contractual arbitration or choice
of forum clauses, as is very positively noted:
3. A natural consequence of the subjection of foreign enteririses to national legislation is the existence of an exclusive competence on the part of
the courts of the host country to hear any case or litigation that arises
from the application of this legislation. On occasion, the foreign enterprise
presumes to escape the jurisdiction of the host State by means of private
agreements in which it is stipulated that any controversy that may arise
concerning the activities of the enterprise shall be resolved by the courts
of the country of origin or of a Third State, or that they will be submitted
to international arbitration. These types of agreements are not acceptable
and, in more than one case, are considered nullified of all right by na-
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IV.

COMPENSATION BY FOREIGN STATES
CASE STUDY: REVERE COPPER ARBITRATION

In 1967, Revere Copper and Brass entered into an investment
agreement with the Republic of Jamaica. Under this agreement,
Revere was granted a 25-year bauxite mining concession in exchange for a promise to construct an alumina plant. The agreement also provided that no further taxes, burdens, or other levies
should be imposed except as expressly provided for in the
agreement.
After concluding the agreement, the Jamaican government enacted certain measures designed to accomplish four policy objectives: (1) increase revenues from bauxite mining and alumina production; (2) recover bauxite ore leased to the mining companies;
(3) reacquire all lands owned by such companies; and (4) obtain
national majority ownership and control of the bauxite industry.,
In January 1974, Prime Minister Michael Manley declared that
"[tihe Government of Jamaica cannot be bound by [existing mineral extraction contracts] any longer. For Jamaica to survive we
must negotiate new contracts and new benefits for our things sold
abroad." 10 At a later conference with Revere and other producers,
the Jamaican government made it clear that it sought to achieve
51 percent local equity participation rather than nationalization
of the industry. It also announced a plan to impose a production
levy of some $14 (Jamaica) per long dry ton of bauxite mined.
Depletion allowances were to be discontinued retroactively and
OPIC insurance premiums would no longer be allowed as a deductible expense.
The Jamaican parliament enacted a statute in June 197411

tional laws ECOSOC Report, Annex IV, at 11. (emphasis added)

None of the South American nations have adopted the [Washington] Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, a further sign that some nations still refuse to arbitrate their disputes. But
see Norberg, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Revisited, 7 LAW. AMERICAS 275 (1975).
Presumably, choice of law clauses would also be considered nullities. See
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ["UNCTAD"] Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Res. 88 (XII), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1474, 1475 (1972) (adopted by a vote of 39-2,
with 23 abstentions).
9. Policy of the Jamaican Bauxite Commission, id. supra note 5 at 1324-25.
10. Id. at 1325.
11. Bauxite (Production Levy) Act, 1974 cited in id. at 1327.
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which imposed a tax on bauxite based on an average realized
price for the commodity on the world market. The Bauxite Production Levy Act put a floor under bauxite tax receipts by prescribing a minimum amount of bauxite each aluminum producer
was required to produce. Failure to produce the minimum
amounts established by these quotas penalized the producer be12
cause taxes were assessed on the basis of the minimum quota.
The parliament simultaneously amended the Mining Law of Jamaica empowering the government to establish minimum bauxite
extraction quotas and to increase royalties paid by the extractors.
After losing approximately $1.5 to $2.0 million dollars in each
of the first four months of 1975, Revere shut down its plant on
August 19,1975. The company instituted local legal proceedings
against the Government of Jamaica in 1976, claiming that the
bauxite levy was a breach of the 1967 agreement and seeking injunctive relief. The Supreme Court of Jamaica denied the claim.13
Revere entered into a contract of guaranty for its Jamaican operations with the United States Department of State's Agency for
International Development (AID) in 1970. This contract was subsequently assumed by OPIC. In pertinent part, the OPIC contract
provided for:
1.15 Expropriatory Action. The term "Expropriatory Action"
means any action which is taken, authorized, ratified or condoned
by the Government of the Project Country, commencing during the
Guaranty Period, with or without compensation therefore, and
which for a period of one year directly results in preventing:
(b) the Investor from effectively exercising its fundamental
rights with respect to the Foreign Enterprise either as shareholder
or as creditor, as the case may be, acquired as a result of the Investment; provided, however, that rights acquired solely as a result
of any undertaking or agreement with the Government of the Project Country shall not be considered fundamental rights merely because they are acquired from such undertaking or agreement; or
(c) the Investor from disposing of the Securities or any rights
accruing therefrom; or
(d) the Foreign Enterprise from exercising effective control over
12. The arbitrators noted that the Supreme Court of Jamaica had held that
the bauxite levy was applicable only during any calendaryear which Revere had
produced bauxite. Id. Under the new law, Revere had to pay bauxite levies for
the entire calendar year 1975, even though its plant was shut down in August
1975.
13. Id. at 1329.
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the use or disposition of a substantial portion of its property or
from constructing the Project or operating the same.

Excluded is any action resulting from:
(1) any law, decree, regulation, or administrative action of the
Government of the Project Country which is not by its express

terms for the purpose of nationalization, confiscation, or expropriation (including but not limited to intervention, condemnation, or
other taking), is reasonably related to constitutionally sanctioned
governmental objectives, is not arbitrary, is based upon a reasonable classification of entities to which it applies and does not vio14
late generally accepted international law principles.
Section 1.15 concluded:
The abrogation, impairment, repudiation or breach by the Government of the Project Country of any undertaking, agreement or
contract relating to the Project shall be considered an Expropriatory Action only if it constitutes Expropriatory Action in
accordance with the criteria set forth in this section.25
In April 1976, Revere submitted an "Application for Compensation" to OPIC alleging expropriation by the government of Jamaica. The company contended that Jamaica had violated both
the 1967 Agreement and generally accepted principles of international law. It further argued that the exclusions of Section 1.15 of
the OPIC contract were inapplicable not only because Jamaica's
conduct violated international norms but also because Revere
was prevented "from exercising effective control over the use or
disposition of a substantial portion of its property."' In December 1976, a panel appointed by the American Arbitration Association heard the case. In this hearing, OPIC, contested the position
that Revere should be reimbursed for the alleged "expropriation"
of company assets by the Jamaican government of a Project
Country, argued that Jamaica had neither taken nor deprived Revere of control over the bauxite investments or project. 17 OPIC
14. Id. at 1322.
15. Id. at 1322.
16. Id. at 1329.
17. AID had taken the same position in a similar case. Valentine Petroleum
and Chemical Corp. v. Agency for Int'l Development, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 889 (1971)(DeVries, Rogers, Seres, Arbs.). Counsel for AID urged that
Valentine, the U.S. investor, had not exhausted his local remedies. This position
is particularly strained, since the facts show that Valentine had been placed
under arrest by an armed military squad and escorted to an outbound plane.
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maintained that the levy could be passed on to Revere's customers as a cost of production, and rejected Revere's claim that Jamaica had abrogated the 1967 agreement. The arbitral tribunal
rejected OPIC's narrow interpretation of the term "expropriation" and the Revere Copper case also raised the issue of whether
international law or Jamaica's municipal law governed the agreement. The arbitral tribunal rejected OPIC's position and found
that Jamaican law was not the only law governing the agreement:
"[W]e accept Jamaican law for all ordinary purposes of the
Agreement, but we do not consider that its applicability for some
purposes precludes the application of principles of public international law which govern the responsibility of States for injuries to
aliens." 18 The arbitral tribunal stated that, traditionally, international law would require the application of municipal law to
breach of contract questions. 19 While regarding long-term economic development agreements as sui generis expressions of contract, the arbitral panel distinguished them from typical contracts
governed by municipal law. The rationale given by the Revere tribunal for this exception was that long-term economic development agreements,
while not made between governments and therefore wholly international, are basically international in that they are entered into as
part of a contemporary international process of economic
development.
[T]he 1967 Agreement falls within this category of a long term
development agreement and... principles of public international
law apply to it insofar as the government party is concerned....
The question of breach by such party cannot be determined solely
by municipal law

... [I]t

would be contrary to well established

principles of international law to leave the question of State responsibility to the alien party to the determination by that State
as to what it lawfully could or could not do. Parliamentary
supremacy and State sovereignty cannot... be the decisive criteria where the contract involved is international in nature and falls
within the category of a long term economic development
agreement. 0
18. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. O.P.I.C., 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1321, 1331
(1978) (Haight & Wetzel, Arbs.).
19. Id. citing C. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY TO ALIENS

(1967).
20. Id. at 1331-32.
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The arbitral tribunal in Revere Copper buttressed its opinion
by citations to decisions by earlier international arbitral tribunals, including two important cases involving oil exploration and
development rights in the Middle East.21
The provisions in the 1967 agreement stipulating that there
would be no further taxes and that investments would be secure
are commonly referred to as "stabilization clauses." Such clauses
are usually found in long-term economic development contracts.
The Revere Copper arbitral tribunal considered this to be an important factor in its determination that the Revere Copper agreement was an international contract governed by international law
as to breach. Thus, the Revere Copper decision follows the exception put forward in the Aramco arbitration for long-term economic development agreements, and expresses only the view of
developed states.
V.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

As already intimated, there is a vigorous debate between developing countries and the developed nations on the question of
whether development agreements convey rights to alien investors
which cannot be abrogated by the host government or whether
the host State retains residual sovereignty over its resources
which subordinates all other considerations.22 United Nations
General Assembly resolutions buttress both positions.
The developed nations rely upon the traditional international
21.

Gov't of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27

INT'L

L.

REP. 117 (1958); Texaco overseas Petroleum Co. (Topco) v. Gov't of Libya, 17
1 (1978) (Dupuy, Arb.). In Aramco, the arbitrators held that
the law of Saudi Arabia must, in case of need, be interpreted or supplemented
by the general principles of law, by the custom and practice in the oil business,
and by notions of pure jurisprudence, in particular whenever certain private
rights-which must inevitably be recognized to the concessionaire if the Concession is not to be deprived of its substance-would not be secured in an unquestionable manner by the law in force in Saudi Arabia. Aramco, 27 INT'L L. REP. at
169. However, the Revere Copper panel failed to cite an even earlier decision,
The Norwegian Claims Case, which stated that, "should the public law of one of
the parties seem contrary to international public policy ... , an international
tribunal is not bound by the municipal law of the states which are parties to the
arbitration. Permanent Court of Arbitration, reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 362,
383 (1922) (arbitration of claims arising from U.S. requisition of Norwegian
ships during World War I).
22. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
INT'L LEGAL MAT.

60

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13.51

law precept that international obligations must be kept (pacta
sunt servanda). This principle is embodied in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 which requires that "foreign investment
agreements freely entered into by, or between, States shall be observed in good faith. '2 3 An arbitration decision involving a dispute between the Radio Corporation of America and the Republic
of China over radio traffic rights relied on this proposition
twenty-seven years prior to the U.N. resolution. In that case, the
tribunal held: "The Chinese Government can certainly sign away
a part of its liberty of action . . . it will, as any other party, be
bound by law and by any obligations, legally accepted."2
The Aramco arbitral panel undoubtebly considered this. principle controlling when it wrote: "Nothing can prevent a State, in
the exercise of its sovereignty, from binding itself irrevocably by
the provisions of a concession and from granting to the consessionaire irretractable rights. Such rights have the character of
'25
acquired rights.
The developed nations' insistence upon the inviolability of contract derives from concern for the stability of international commerce which is grounded on the protection of contractual rights.
Many developing countries, on the other hand, committed to redistribution of the world's wealth, declare their continuing sovereignty over their natural resources and assert their authority to
amend or nullify long-term economic development agreements.
Their arguments demonstrate their indifference to the traditional
Western view of contract. Consequently, there is no international
consensus on the legal status of long-term development agreements. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution, No.
3281, is the Charter most often cited by the developing countries
to support their claim that international law gives priority to
State sovereignty rights over contractual rights to natural resources. In this resolution the General Assembly proclaimed:

23.

G.A.

Res.

1803,

17 U.N.

GAOR 135, U.N.

Doc. A/RES/1803

(XVII)(1962).
24. Radio Corp. of America (R.C.A.) v. Republic of China, reprinted in 30

AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 540 (1936). The award did state, however, that any restriction of a government's right of action must be clearly and distinctly noted. Id.
at 540.
25. Gov't of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 INT'L L.
REP. 117, 168 (1958). Accord, Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil
Co., 35 INT'L L. REP. 136 (1963).

Winter 1980]

COMPENSATION BY FOREIGN STATES

1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its
wealth, natural resources, and economic activities.
2. Each state has the right...
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid
by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent.26

The developing countries have taken these propositions to sup-

port their position that the law governing long-term economic development agreements must be the municipal law of the host
State.2 7 They also point to a decision by the International Court
of Justice which supports their position, at least by inference. In
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, the Court rejected the view that a
concessionary contract between a government and a foreign private corporation could be considered an international treaty.28 In
keeping with this view, a former President of the International
Court of Justice has considered the legal status of stabilization
clauses, which the Revere Copper arbitral tribunal regarded as
the hallmark of a long-term economic development agreement.
He first dismissed the view that there is an international law of
contracts, and argues that, even if there were, the principle of a
State's permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural re-

sources would be recognized as a controlling principle of international law.2 9

26. G.A. Res. 3281, Art. 2, paras. 1, 2(c), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50,
52 U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
27. See ECOSOC Report, supra note 22 at 15.
28. Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, [1952] I.C.J. 93. See Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalizationof Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.

& POL. 179, 190-91 (1978). Arechaga was until recently the President of the International Court of Justice. He appears to have retreated from the hardline
ECOSOC position with respect to arbitration clauses, giving them independent
standing in a contract. Id. at 191.
29. Id. at 191-92, Even while rejecting the necessity to comply with its contractual obligations, a developing country is likely to justify taking by a claim of
changed circumstances (rebus sic standibus), as in Revere Copper. See Geiger,
The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 73, 85-86 (1974). The principle of rebus sic standibus allows the
abrogation of a treaty between two States due to a fundamental change of circumstances. Applicability of the doctrine is addressed by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, Article 62, which declares:
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The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States has been
dismissed by several commentators as a mere declaration of principles;30 they have noted that the United States and five other
industrialized countries voted against it.31 Ten other industrialized nations abstained from voting.3 2 Custom is recognized as a
source of public international law.3 3 However, since the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties was not voted for by a significant
number of industrialized countries with significant international
trade involvement, it has been argued that the Charter cannot be
considered to be an expression of a consensus among nations
equivalent to a new norm of customary international law.34
In contrast to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties when
Resolution 180335 was formulated in 1963 there was in fact a consensus of nations. The status of this resolution as representing
customary international law was subsequently reinforced by the
TOPCO arbitral award. Professor DuPuy noted in the arbitral
award that, "[o]n the basis of the circumstances of adoption mentioned above and by expressing an opinio juris communis, Resolution 1803(XVII) seems to this Tribunal to reflect the state of
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard

to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was
not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminat-

ing or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential ba-

sis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, opened for signature May 12, 1969, reprinted in 8 Int'l Legal Mat. 679 (1969).
30. See Haight, supra note 1, at 597; Brower & Tepe, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International
Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and

Duties of States and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L.
309 (1976).

31. Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Gemany, Luxembourg, and the
United Kingdom.
32. Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, and Sweden.
33. STATUTE OF THE INT'L CT. OF JUSTICE, art. 38.

34. Most scholars agree that the resolutions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations are not law and do not have binding effect. See Haight, supra
note 1, at 597 and authorities cited therein.
35. Supra note 23.
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customary law in this field."36 DuPuy also analyzed the Charter of

Economic Rights and Duties and concluded that "international
law may operate as a factor limiting the freedom of the State
should foreign interests be affected, even though Article 2 [of the
Charter] does not state this explicitly.

'3

7

Certainly, Resolution

1803 is the last expression of consensus on the principle that sovereign states are bound by contractual obligations with private
entities. In view of both the resolve of some LDCs to exercise sovereignty and their voting patterns in the United Nations and in
regional multilateral meetings, however, one is forced to conclude
that this "consensus" has vanished.
VI.

COMPENSATION FOR TAKING

The duty of a State under international law to compensate an
alien for the taking of his property is recognized by industrialized
countries and developing countries alike. Even Socialist countries which had earlier denied any responsibility to compensate
have now obligated themselves to reimburse private producers for
losses caused by expropriation. While there may be a consensus
on the duty of host States to compensate aliens for the taking of
their property, there is no consensus on either the rationale for
such a duty or appropriate standards of compensation.
Traditionally the alien investor has been accorded certain acquired property rights in his investment including the right to
36. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. (TOPCO) v. Gov't of Libya, 17

INT'L LE-

GAL MAT. 1, 30 (1978) (Dupuy, Arb.).

37. Id., at 31 (citing Castafteda, La Charte des Droits et Devoirs Economiques des Etats. Note sur son Processus d'Elaboration,20 A.F.D.I. [sic] 31, 54
(1974)). Dupuy elaborated on this opinion as follows:
One should conclude that a sovereign State which nationalizes cannot disregard the commitments undertaken by the contracting State: to decide
otherwise would in fact recognize that all contractual commitments undertaken by a State have been undertaken under a purely permissive condition on its part and are therefore lacking of any legal force and any binding effect. From the point of view of its advisability, such a solution would
gravely harm the credibility of States since it would mean that contracts
signed by them did not bind them; it would introduce in such contracts a
fundamental imbalance because in these contracts only one party-the
party contracting with the State-would be bound. In law, such an outcome would go directly against the most elementary principle of good
faith.
Id. at 31.
38. See Arechaga, supra note 28, at 192.
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compensation by any host State which takes that property.3 9 This
"property view" is clearly stated in the arbitral decision in the
Norwegians Claims Case where the tribunal held that: Whether
the action of the United States was lawful or not, just compensation is due to the claimants under the municipal law of the
United States, as well as under international law, based upon re40
spect for private property.
While the traditional view maintains that alien investors possess inherent property rights in their foreign investments, developing countries proclaiming the New International Economic Order advance the opinion that "the acquired right to private
property, in particular private ownership of the means of industrial production, is no longer protected by contemporary international law. . . . The assertion of the existence of a duty of restitution of a nationalized undertaking would be tantamount to a
denial of the right to nationalize. 4 1 These developing nations argue that the legal foundation for compensation payments to
aliens does not spring from inherent or acquired property rights

39. The bilateral agreements between the United States and Soviet bloc
countries are good examples. See, e.g., the United States-Romania Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation, issued December
5, 1973, which contains the following clause:
"Except for a public purpose, assets belonging to nationals, companies and
economic organizations of one of the two countries will not be expropriated by
the other country, nor will they be expropriated without the payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation." 26 U.S.T. 2305, 2345, T.I.A.S. No. 8159.
The Soviet bloc countries have even formalized agreements among themselves
which provide for compensation. Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Outstanding Property Questions, Feb. 11, 1956, Yugoslavia-Czechoslovakia, 397
U.N.T.S. 150.
40. Norwegian Claims Case (United States-Norway) 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 362,
388 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922). See also Radio Corp. of America (R.C.A.) v. Republic
of China, where it was noted that,
in public law the sentence pacta sunt servanda will also apply, just as
public interest requires stability as regards any arrangement legally agreed
upon....
How far an essential alteration in the interests of the public which may,
in certain cases, lie behind an administration contract, may influence the
continued validity of the contract will be dealt with later on, but it may be
emphasized already here that any alteration or cancellation of the agreement on this basis as a rule should only be possible subject to compensation to the other party.
R.C.A. 30 AM. J. INT'L L. at 531 (footnote omitted).
41. Arechaga, supra note 29, at 181.
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but rather from the doctrine of unjust enrichment.42 The host
state must avoid taking advantage of investments made by alien
investors. Application of a theory of unjust enrichment has immediate consequences for such an investor. Mr. Arechaga succinctly
stated these consequences:
This principle signifies that it is not the elements of the loss suffered by the expropriated individual owner, but rather the enrichment, the beneficial gain which has been obtained by the nationalizing State, which must be taken into account. Any measure which
results in a transfer of wealth in favor of the nationalizing State or
one of its agencies gives rise to a duty to compensate. For example,
the total suppression of a detrimental or inconvenient industrial or
commercial activity, for reasons of general policy, is not subject to
compensation. In that case, nothing is gained by the nationalizing
State, despite the loss suffered by the foreign owner. Similarly,
there is no duty to compensate for loss of good will when the abolition of free market conditions of competition nullifies the value of
this intangible asset.
However, the municipal law doctrine of unjust enrichment in all
its aspects, cannot be mechanically transplanted into the sphere of
international law. What makes the doctrine of unjust enrichment
highly relevant to nationalizations is its equitable foundation,
which requires the taking into account of all the circumstances of
each specific situation and the balancing of the claims of the dispossessed alien with the undue advantages that he may have enjoyed prior to nationalization. Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment would take into account the undue enrichment gained by
foreign companies during a period of monopoly or of highly privileged economic position, as, for instance, during a period of colo43
nial domination.

The lack of consensus about the legal rationale for compensation
is manifest by the multiple standards of compensation which
have been applied in expropriation cases.
The Permanent Court of International Justice articulated the
classical standard governing compensation in the Chorzow Factory Case: "Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in
kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sus42. For an earlier discussion of unjust enrichment as a philosophical basis for
compensation, see Meron, Repudiation of Ultra Vires State Contracts and the
InternationalResponsibility of States, 6 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 273, 281-82 (1957).
43. Arechaga, supra note 29 at 182-83 (footnotes omitted).
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tained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it. . . .

This classical standard was later rejected by the Bremen Court
of Appeals in the Indonesian Tobacco Case: "Compensations
could not be paid in full and promptly out of the substance, but
could only be made out of the proceeds of the nationalized enterprises. Compensation as to time and amount must therefore be
made in accordance with the conditions in the expropriating
state."' 4" These early standards led to the prevailing international

law standard of compensation today which is "appropriate" compensation, a standard open to many differing interpretations.
The two United Nations General Assembly resolutions discussed above, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(1803(XVII)) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States (3281 (XVX)) have required that compensation by host
States be "appropriate." Resolution 1803 states:
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based
on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall
be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise
of its sover4
eignty and in accordance with international law. "
44. [1928] P.C.I.J.,ser. A.,No.17, at 47. See also Norwegian Claims Case, in
which it was held that
"Just compensation" implies a complete restitution of the status quo
ante, based, not upon future gains of the United States or other powers,
but upon the loss of profits of the Norwegiin owners as compared with
other owners of similar property...
It is common ground between the parties that just compensation, as it is
understood in the United States, should be literally awarded, and that is
should be based upon the net value of the property taken.
17 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393.
45. N.V. Verenrgde Deli-Maatschapijen & N.V. Senembach-Maatchappij v.
Deutsch-Indonesrsche Tabak-H~ndelsgesellschaft m.b.h., cited in Domke, Indonesian NationalizationMeasures Before Foreign Courts, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 305,
317 (1960). But see Foreign Nationalizations:Some Contemporary Aspects of
InternationalLaw, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 608 (1961). The Amsterdam Appellate Court felt that "under the actual circumstances a true intent to compensate
for damages is to be considered as non-existent." Indonesian Tobacco Case, 54
AM.J. INT'L L., at 318.
46. G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 23, at 136.
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Arechaga points out in his article 47 that developing countries are
fully prepared to set off excessive profits against the present compensable value of the alien investor's property. In addition, alien
investors may be penalized retroactively for rights granted by colonial powers. Factors that may be considered by the host State
in determining the amount of compensation due include the
amount, if any, of the initial investment recovered; undue enrichment resulting from colonial grants of right; excessive profits; the
contribution of the enterprise to the economic and social development of the country; the investor's respect for labor laws; and re48
investment policies.

The Carter administration recently instructed the Department

of State to advise all United States diplomatic and consular posts
of its policies toward foreign investment. A communication entitled "U.S. Government Policy on Direct International Investment" directed that the United States Government should
neither promote nor discourage inward or outward investment

flows or activities.

' 49

Somewhat anomalously, the United States

policy tatement then proceeded to note that
We respect the right of each country to determine the environment in which foreign investment takes place in that country. Once
foreign investments have been made on that basis, governments
should not discriminate against established firms on the basis of
nationality or deprive such firms of their rights under international
law, such as adequate compensation for expropriated property.50

47. Arechaga, supra note 28, at 183-85.
48. Id. at 185.
49. Dep't of State telegram no. 185216 to all diplomatic and consular posts
(August 6, 1977), reprinted in [1977] DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 773. This statement of neutrality is incongruous in the face of both the coercive economic statutes detailed in the text accompanying notes 60-80, infra and the U.S. tax law
treatment of foreign expropriation loss. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1212(a) which allows a
corporation a ten-year period which to carry forward a "foreign expropriation
capital loss," defined in I.R.C. § 1212(a)(2)(A); I.R.C. §§ 165 (g)(3), 1231(a)
permit a U.S. corporation whose foreign subsidiary is nationalized to treat the
uncompensated loss as an ordinary loss to be deducted from current income. A
net operating loss deduction is also available to a U.S. taxpayer as a carryover
for ten years, I.R.C. §§ 172(b)(1)(D), (1351).
50. Dep't of State telegram no. 185216, supra n. 50 (emphasis added). Cf. 22
U.S.C. §§ 2351(a), 2351(b) (1976). The telegram's reference to "adequate compensation" suggests the United States view that only compensation which is
"prompt, adequate and effective" is satisfactory under international law.
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The traditional United States view of what constitutes adequate
compensation is found in the Harvard Draft Convention on the
Law of Treaties:
The taking, under the authority of the State, of any property of
an alien, or the use thereof, for a public purpose clearly recognized as such by a law of general applicationin effect at the time
of the taking is wrongful if not accompanied by prompt payment

of compensation in accordance with the highest of the following
standards:
(a) compensation which is no less favorable than that granted to
nationals of such State; or
(b) just compensation in terms of the fair market value of the

property or of the use thereof unaffected by this or other takings or
by conduct attributable to the State and designed to depress the
value of the property in anticipation of the taking; or
(c) if no fair market value exists, just compensation in terms of
the fair value of such property or of the use thereof. If a treaty
requires a special standard of compensation, the compensation
shall be paid in accordance with the treaty.51
Similarly, the Second Restatement of United States Foreign Relations Law defines "just compensation" as that which is "adequate
and paid in a form
in amount, paid with reasonable promptness,
52
that is effectively realizable by the alien.

Perhaps the clearest expression of the United States commitment to this standard for compensation lies in the government's
attempt to incorporate a "prompt, adequate and effective" definition of compensation within U.N. General Assembly Resolution
1803. The United States proposal read "the owner shall be paid
appropriate, prompt, adequate and effective compensation. ' 53
This proposal met with sharp criticism that the proposed language was unnecessary and detrimental to the interests of developing nations.54 The United States ultimately withdrew its propo51. Draft Convention, supra note 2 art. 10, para. 4. (emphasis added). The
Harvard Draft Convention provides that just compensation may be paid over a

reasonable period of years if certain safeguards are provided. Id.
52.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW

§ 187

(1965).
53.

Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sover-

eignty over NaturalResources, [1963] A.B.A.J. 463, 465. Schwebel was the legal
adviser to the U.S. Delegation the the 17th U.N. General Assembly, which
adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII).
54. Hungary stated: "the concept of prompt, adequate and effective compen-
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sal. Though the world community has apparently rejected the
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation" standard, the
United States has continued to endorse and promote it. For example, bilateral commercial treaties between the United States
and other nations often contain a provision which stipulates that,
in the event of a taking of property, compensation shall be
"prompt, adequate and effective. ' ' 55 They also stipulate the currency to be used for payment in the event of expropriation. 56
Public statements by United States officials also evidence the
United States standard for compensation. In a December 30,
1975, statement of policy the Department of State reiterated its
view that foreign investors are entitled to the fair market value of
their interests. 57 Subsequently, Richard J. Smith, Director of Investment Affairs, Department of State, succinctly stated the
United States position in a 1976 address at Vanderbilt University:
Our policy can be simply stated: we recognize the rights of any
country to expropriate the property of a U.S. investor, in the absence of specifiic governmental undertakings to the contrary, so
long as the taking is nondiscriminatory, for a public purpose and
accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation. In
our view, these are the minimum standards under international
58
law.
The United States Congress has enacted several statutes which
reflect the same stance taken in international commercial relations that, if a foreign State is not forthcoming with "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation for the taking of United
sation, which the United States wished to impose and codify as a sort of international law, would be flagrantly unjust to emerging nations." Id.
55. See, e.g., United States-Romania Joint Statement, supra note 40.
56. See, e.g., the Investment Guaranties Agreement, Aug. 3, 1974, United
States-Nigeria, T.I.A.S. No. 8012, reprinted in [1974] DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L.,
at 428. These investment guaranties usually require the United States to subrogate the claims of its citizen-investors and to settle disputes by arbitration. For
an expression of the position of the South American countries on the Calvo
Clause, which would force an alien investor to renounce his right to have his
country intercede diplomatically on his behalf, see Arechaga, supra note 29, at
193-94.
57. U.S. Policy on Foreign Investment and Nationalization Reiterated, Dec.
30, 1975, reprinted in 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. (No. 1910) 138 (1976). See also
Leigh, Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Investment-Recent Trends, [1972]
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 197 (Leigh later became a legal advisor to the

State Department.).
58. Reprinted in [1976] DIG. U.S.

PRAC. INT'L L.

at 443.
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States citizens' property, it may face a cut-off of United States
financial assistance. The best known of these legislative acts is
the "Hickenlooper Amendment," a 1962 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961."' Four legislative measures include
the Trade Act of 1974,60 the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1974,61
regional development legal acts, and agricultural assistance acts.
(a) Hickenlooper Amendment.-Under the Hickenlooper
Amendment, the President must suspend assistance to the government of any country which either has repudiated or nullified
contracts with United States citizens or has nationalized, expropriated or imposed discriminatory taxes upon property with
greater than 50 percent United States citizen ownership without
paying "speedy compensation for such property in convertible
62
foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value" of such property.
Where the President determines that such suspension of assistance is inimical to the national interests of the United States,
the amendment is not applicable. 3
(b) Ineligibility for Preferential Trade Treatment.Subchapter V of the Trade Act of 197464 established the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), a system which provides for
tariff-free entry for merchandise imported from designated developing countries. This GSP treatment is highly desirable in that
it insures less costly access to United States markets.
Section 502(b)(4)65 of the Act, however, requires the President
to withdraw or suspend eligible countries from GSP treatment if
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation is not paid for
expropriations of United States citizens' property. Recently, the
People's Republic of the Congo had its GSP eligibility withdrawn
for failing to meet this compensation standard."
(c) Fishermen'sProtective Act of 1967.-In order to encourage
the United States fishing fleets to operate despite the risks of
seizure of their vessels, the United States enacted the Fishermen's Protection Act of 1967.67 This statute guarantees United

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1976).
19 Id. §§ 2101-2487.
22 Id. §§ 1971-79.
Id..§ 2370(e)(1).
Id. § 2370(e)(2).

64. 19 Id. §§ 2461-65.
65.

Id. § 2462(b)(4).

66.

See [1977] DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 674-75.

67.

22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-79 (1976). See generally Neville, A Possible Tuna War
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States vessels both financial and consular protection of crew and
owners upon seizure. The seizing State's eligibility for U.S. foreign assistance has been linked to reimbursement within 120 days
of notification of costs incurred by the United States on behalf of
a seized vessel.68 Predictably, the countries targeted by this measure, i.e., members of the Organization of American States, protested this statutory linkage of financial aid with efforts to neutralize the territorial fishery claims of the other Western
Hemisphere States. 9
(d) United States Pressure on InternationalLending Institutions.-Economic pressure can be brought to bear upon a State
which has taken property of a United States citizen by denying
financial assistance ordinarily channeled through international
financial institutions. Under the Inter-American Development
Bank ("IDB") Act,7 0 the International Development Association

("IDA") Act,7 1 the Asian Development Bank Act, 72 and the Africa
with Canada,N.Y.L.J. (1979).
68. 22 U.S.C. § 1975(b) (1976).
69. In response to such a claim by the Government of Ecuador in 1972, the
United States replied as follows:
The application of United States law to the granting or withholding of
foreign assistance does not come within the terms of the internaional obligation to which your note [of protest] referred. Assistance between nations
depends upon a high degree of mutuality and such assistance is provided
on terms that are acceptable to all parties concerned. An aid relationship
is a function of many factors that can and do change, and nothing in international law or practice implies that either the furnishing or the acceptance of assistance is obligatory.
Note of March 14, 1972, reprinted in Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New
Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for NationalizedProperty, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 474, 491-92 n. 53 (1977). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was
amended in 1965 to exclude foreign assistance to any country which seizes or
imposes any penalty or sanction against a United States fishing vessel on account of-fishing activities in international waters. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(o) (1976).
70. 22 U.S.C. §§ 283-283(z) (1976). Section 283(r) containing loan restrictions
for expropriation of United States property was added by the Gonzalez Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-246, § 1, 86 Stat. 59. Further, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §
2831(c), the U.S. representative must disapprove the IDB's affiliate Fund for
Special Operations' assistance to countries for which assistance has been suspended under the Hickenlooper Amendment.
71. 22 U.S.C. §§ 284-284n (1976). Section 284 also contains loan restrictions
added by the Gonzalez Amendment. See note 70, supra.
72. 22 U.S.C. §§ 285-285t (1976). Section 285(o) contains loan restrictions
similar to section 283(r). See note 70, supra.
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Development Fund Act, 3 the President is directed to instruct
United States representatives sitting on the boards of international development banks, including the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, to vote against any loan which
is earmarked for the benefit of a country which has not given
prompt, adequate and effective compensation to deserving United
States citizens. The Congress was clearly concerned about the increasing number of expropriations of U.S. property which were
not compensated under the United States standard. 7 4 An excep-

tion in the Inter-American Development Bank Act provides that
if a seizing State has not completed compensation payments, but

has nonetheless consented to arbitration pursuant to the [Washington] Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
the United States will not require its representatives on the IDB
to cast a negative vote against aid to that country. 5 '
(e) Agricultural Countermeasures.-In 1962 the Congress authorized the President to withhold or suspend sugar import quotas of an expropriating State if it is not forthcoming with
prompt, adequate and effective compensation.7 6 In view of its im-

73. 22 U.S.C. §§ 290g to 290g-10 (1976). Section 290(g-8) contains a veto for
any use of funds for a country pursuing a "detrimental economic policy against
United States interests."
74. The legislative history of these measures is clear on this point. H. R. REP.
No. 770, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2002, 2007; H.R. REP. No. 772, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2011, 2017; H.R. REP. No. 771, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1992, 1997. See also SENATE
COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND

RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATION BILL, 1980, S. REP. No. 358, 96th Cong., 1st

Sess. 26 (1979).
75. 22 U.S.C. § 283r(B) (1976). The House Committee on Banking and Currency Report shows that
The Committee is disturbed that this useful instrument has not been
utilized despite the fact of a growing number of expropriations. A quasijudicial resolution of investment controversies would seem to be preferable to the political confrontations that now occur. It is the Committee's
hope that this new provision will lead to greater use of the [CSID] forum.
H. REP. No. 92-770, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2008, 2018. On the Washington Convention, see 22 U.S.C. §§
1650, 1650(a) (1976). The latter statute insures that "the pecuniary obligations
imposed by such an [arbitral] award shall be enforced and shall be given the
same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of
general jurisdiction of one of the several States."
76. Act of July 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-535, § 15, 76 Stat. 166 (1962) (codi-
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portance to many developing countries, this statute provided direct and immediate coercion to comply with the United States
standard."7
The President is ordinarily authorized to negotiate and conclude agreements with "friendly" countries which provide for sale
of agricultural commodities in dollars (on credit terms) or foreign
currencies. 8 If a country has taken United States property without prompt, adequate and effective compensation, however, it can
be characterized as an "unfriendly" nation. The Hickenlooper
Amendment disqualifies such taking States from United States
agricultural assistance.7 9
United States officials have consistently advocated adoption of

the "prompt, adequate and effective" standard for compensation.
Domestic legislation clearly shows the United States willingness
to use considerable financial leverage to discourage developing nations from taking its citizens' property without such
compensation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The words of Professors Sohn and Baxter, even though nearly
two decades old, sum up the developing nations' position.
A rule requiring the payment of compensation under all circumstances had the positive benefit of stimulating international trade
and investment by affording protection to the business activities of
aliens in foreign countries. It would be inequitable that a government should ... seek the economic benefits which foreign trade
and investment carry with them, and at the same time call for the
adoption of a rule placing such foreign activities at the mercy of
the very government which seeks this economic assistance. In
terms of social justice, the taking of the property of aliens may
create greater hardships to the aliens whose property it is than it
brings benefits to the State seizing the property. The events of two
World Wars have demonstrated in a tragic fashion that a man may
be as effectively killed by depriving him of his property as he can

fled at 7 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (1976)).
77. For an appraisal of this statute's impact on Peru in the wake of the Peruvian nationalizations of U.S. property, see Huerta, Peruvian Nationalization
and the Peruvian-AmericanCompensation Agreements, 10 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1, 30, 31-32 (1977).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
79. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(1976).
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0

On the other hand, developing nations will continue to advocate
minimal compensation based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. These arguments based on equity appeal to nationalistic
leaders who remain convinced that their nation has been exploited, and therefore the traditional rationale for compensation
lacks merit. Given the continuing competition for the dwindling
available natural resources in the world, questions of compensation will continue to play a dynamic role in litigation.

80.

Sohn & Baxter, supra note 2, at 557.

